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NOTES
"Filthy Words": One Man's Lyric or
Broadcasting's Indecency?
The author discusses the legal and philosophical implica-
tions of the Supreme Court's pronouncement in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, which restricts the right to broadcast and empha-
sizes the right to prevent "indecent" speech from intruding upon
individual privacy.
At approximately 2 o'clock in the afternoon on October 30,
1973, WBAI-FM, a noncommercial New York City radio station
licensed to the Pacifica Foundation, broadcast a short monologue
entitled "Filthy Words," by satirist George Carlin) After listing the
"seven words you couldn't say on the airwaves,"' Carlin proceeded
to illustrate their usage in a variety of colloquial expressions. Two
weeks later, a man who had heard the Carlin piece while driving in
his car with his teenage son, protested its broadcast in a letter to
the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).' The complaint
was forwarded to Pacifica, which pointed out that the segment was
presented in the context of a program dealing with contemporary
views toward language.5 Further, Pacifica explained,"Carlin is not
mouthing obscenities, he is merely using words to satirize as harm-
less and essentially silly our attitudes towards those words."' Paci-
fica noted that prior to the broadcast, listeners were warned that the
piece contained "sensitive language which might be offensive to
some," Neither Pacifica nor the FCC received any further com-
1. The piece was taken from an album by the comedian, entitled George Carlin, Occupa-
tion: Foole, Little David Records (LD 1005).
2. For a verbatim transcript of the seven infamous words together with the remainder
of the monologue, see FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 751-55 app. (1978).
3. Id. at 752.
4. 56 F.C.C.2d 94 (1975). The complaint read, in pertinent part, "This was supposed to
be part of a comedy monologue, ... [any child could have been turning the dial, and tuned
in to that garbage." Id. at 95.
5. The Pacifica Foundation explained that the segment was broadcast during a
regularly scheduled live program called "Lunchpail," hosted by Paul Gorman, and that on
October 30 the program "consisted of Mr. Gorman's commentary as well as analysis of
contemporary society's attitudes toward language," that the subject was discussed with lis-
teners who called in, and that "Mr. Gorman played the George Carlin segment as it keyed
into a general discussion of the use of language in our society." Id. at 95.
6. Id. at 96.
7. Id. at 95-96.
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plaints regarding the broadcast. On February 21, 1975, the FCC
issued a declaratory order characterizing the monologue as
"indecent"' and prohibiting its rebroadcast.' Clarifying its position
in a subsequent opinion, 0 the FCC explained that its intent had not
been to ban indecent speech altogether." Drawing an analogy to
nuisance law, the Commission asserted that patently offensive lan-
guage, such as the Carlin monologue, should be "channeled" to
those times of the day when children are least likely to be in the
listening audience."
Pacifica appealed the ruling in the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia, which reversed the Commission's
order. 3 Judge Tamm, joined by Chief Judge Bazelon, viewed the
FCC's action as censorship in clear violation of section 326 of the
Communications Act." Dissenting Judge Leventhal, however,
8. [T~he concept of 'indecent' is intimately connected with the exposure of
children to language that describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by
contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excre-
tory activities and organs, at times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that
children may be in the audience.
Id. at 98.
9. Acknowledging that WBAI could have been the subject of administrative sanctions,
the Commission declined to impose formal penalties; instead, it decided to keep the order
in the station's license file for reference in the event future complaints were received. Id.
at 99.
The Commission claimed its power to regulate indecent programming derived from two
statutes: 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1976), which prohibits the use of "any obscene, indecent, or
profane language by means of radio communications," and 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1976) which
requires the Commission to "encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public
interest." Additionally, the FCC identified four characteristics unique to broadcasting which,
the Commission argued, mandate its distinctive treatment: (1) broadcasting intrudes directly
into the home, where privacy interests are greatest; (2) television and radio are particularly
accessible to children, who are often left unsupervised in the home; (3) unwilling adult
listeners may be exposed to offensive programming, with no prior warning; and (4) scarcity
of spectrum space requires strict governmental licensing of stations in the public interest. 56
F.C.C.2d at 97.
In view of the evolution of broadcasting into the principal form of mass communication
in American life, these valid privacy concerns necessarily have become tempered by the
growing public nature of the medium. The real fight turns not on the degree to which tradi-
tional privacy interests must be favored in the balance of a particular situation, but rather
on how broadly the "public interest" standard must be interpreted, given the first amend-
ment mandate and the changing nature of privacy itself.
10. Pacifica Foundation, 59 F.C.C.2d 892 (1976). The clarification order was in response
to a petition by the Radio and Television News Directors Association.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 893.
13. Pacifica Foundation v. FCC, 556 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
14. Id. at 18. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1970) provides that:
[Niothing in this Act shall be understood or construed to give the Commission
the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by
any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be promulgated or fixed
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found a compelling state interest in the protection of children which
empowered the Commission to regulate indecent language. 5 Grant-
ing Pacifica's petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court of the
United States held, reversed: The scope of United States Code, title
18, section 1464, is not limited to "obscene" language; "indecent"
language may be prohibited from the airwaves at times when chil-
dren are likely to be in the listening audience. FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).11
The broadcast medium juxtaposes clashing constitutional in-
terests: the right of speakers to communicate over the public air-
waves, and the right of listeners to prevent intrusion of undesired
by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of free speech by means
of radio communication.
In a concurring opinion for the court of appeals, Chief Judge Bazelon rejected the efficacy
of a nuisance theory as a means of avoiding censorship; on that basis, he felt compelled to
reach the constitutional issues. Recognizing that the effect of channeling might be that of a
complete bar, the Chief Judge found the FCC order violative of the first amendment and, by
extension, the statutory ban on censorship of the airwaves. 556 F.2d 9, 18 (1977). Judge
Tamm, speaking for the majority in the same decision, cited empirical data indicating that
substantial numbers of children remain in the listening audience until 1:30 a.m. Thus, Judge
Tamm saw the Commission's order as veiled censorship, which would, in effect, "reduce the
adult population to hearing or viewing only that which is fit for children." Id. at 17 (citing
Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957)). Alternatively, Judge Tamm interpreted the
FCC order as the functional equivalent of a rule and therefore overbroad. 556 F.2d at 18.
The validity of any distinction between censorship of specific language prior to broadcast
and the creation of a "flexible" category of indecent speech was also challenged by Commis-
sioner Cox in Jack Straw Memorial Foundation, 21 F.C.C.2d 833 (1970). Dissenting to the
Commission's imposition of sanctions for the broadcast of offensive language, he stated:
If a list of all the words which either offend the majority-or which they think
will offend too many of the public-were ever published as banned from the air,
that would clearly be prior censorship prohibited by section 326 of the Communi-
cations Act, as well as the first amendment. But failure to publish the list may
have even more chilling effect upon broadcast programming, because licensees
may avoid the use of many, many more words out of fear they may be on the
Commission's secret list.
Id. at 838.
15. 556 F.2d at 30-37.
16. Justice Stevens wrote the plurality opinion, in which he was joined by Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Rehnquist. According to this opinion:
Entirely apart from the fact that the subsequent review of program content is not
the sort of censorship at which the statute was directed, its history makes it
perfectly clear that it was not intended to limit the Commission's power to regu-
late the broadcast of obscene, indecent, or profane language.
438 U.S. at 737.
In a separate opinion, Justices Powell and Blackmun rejected the legitimacy of value
distinctions made by the plurality among different types of protected speech. Justice Stewart
dissented on grounds of statutory interpretation; he found no power in the FCC to regulate
nonobscene speech. In addition to opposing its statutory construction, Justice Brennan, in a
separate dissent joined by Justice Marshall, challenged the premises and conclusions of the
plurality.
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speech 'into the privacy of their homes. The Federal Communica-
tions Commission has been empowered to coordinate these compet-
ing concerns within a broad framework of encouraging "the larger
and more effective use of radio in the public interest."'7 Approval
by the Supreme Court of the Commission's interpretation of the
public interest standard in Pacifica to permit a ban of indecent
speech reflects, in turn, a cutback in the established meaning and
reach of the first amendment.
Recognizing the value of open expression to individual self-
definition" and to a healthy polity,'9 the Court, in other contexts,
has upheld regulation of speech only where necessary to preserve the
very existence of the social order" or where competing, fundamental
17. 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1970) provides as follows:
Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the Commission from time to
time, as public convenience, interest or necessity requires, shall-
(g) study new uses for radio, provide for experimental uses of frequencies,
and generally encourage the larger and more effective use of radio in the public
interest.
18. The Supreme Court has long recognized the significance of freedom of expression to
the full development of individual identity. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971);
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). This principle has also
been stated eloquently in Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72
YALE L.J. 877, 880-82 (1963).
19. A noted political scientist, Alexander Meiklejohn, viewed the central goal of the first
amendment as the protection of speech vital to the processes of self-government. See, A.
MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT passim (1948). The Su-
preme Court has acknowledged the inseparable relationship between freedom to communi-
cate and the vitality of the political system. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964), in which Justice Brennan propounded the principle that debate on public
issues must be "uninhibited, robust and wide-open." Id. at 270.
20. On that basis, the Supreme Court has identified narrowly drawn categories of out-
lawed communication. Most notable among them are obscenity, "fighting words" and subver-
sive speech. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), Justice Brennan affirmed the
principle that "laill ideas having the slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox
ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion" are entitled
to the full protection of the first amendment. Id. at 484. The rationale he offered for prohibit-
ing obscene speech derived from its total lack of "redeeming social importance." Id. Yet, after
Roth, just as before, confusion continued to plague the Court in its attempts to identify
obscenity. The subsequent standard articulated in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24
(1973), broadened the scope of obscenity to encompass communication which lacks serious
social value. Under the prevailing Miller test, three elements are required to uphold a finding
of obscenity: "(a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary community standards'
would find the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest . . .(b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary,
artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. at 24 (citation omitted). Another proscribed cate-
gory of "fighting words"-personal insults aimed directly at listeners and provocative of
violent retaliation-was established by the Supreme Court in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,
315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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rights would otherwise be threatened."'
In an effort to reconcile the elemental concerns of privacy and
free speech in the context of broadcasting, the Court in FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation2  adhered to a methodology in which the degree
of first amendment protection varies according to the particular
medium involved.23 Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, con-
curred in the FCC's view of the unique concerns implicated in
broadcasting, particularly the attributes of a captive audience. 24 In
recognition of these concerns, the plurality labeled broadcasting as
the medium least deserving of first amendment protection.2
Striking the balance in favor of unwilling adults and children
on that basis, the plurality made a clear judgment regarding the
value to society of the particular language utilized by Carlin. Under-
lying the plurality's determination appears to be a genuine, albeit
unacknowledged, desire to preserve its particular vision of society.
A comparable concern has been more openly voiced elsewhere:
Today's market is being pre-empted by dirty books, movies,
etc. . . . [tihe settlement we are now living under, in which
obscenity and democracy are regarded as equals, is wrong-it is
In Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), Justice Holmes articulated the prohibi-
tion of speech which is "used in such circumstances and [is] of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent." Id. at 52. The Court's standard for controlling inciteful, subversive speech
was refrained narrowly in the recent case of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); such
langauge may be prohibited only where it is "directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to create or produce such action." Id. at 47 (footnote omitted).
21. For example, the Court has upheld speech regulations designed to protect interests
of privacy in the home, see Rowan v. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) ("a mailer's right
to communicate [unsolicited advertisements for sexual materials] must stop at the mailbox
of an unreceptive addressee"), and to shelter the sensibilities of listeners in the public streets,
see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (upholding prohibition of loudspeakers attached to
vehicles in public areas).
22. 438 U.S. 727 (1978).
23. Justice Stevens derived support for this methodological approach from the observa-
tion of the Court in Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) that "[elach method
[of expression] tends to present its own peculiar problems." Id. at 503. As Chief Judge
Bazelon noted, however, in his concurring opinion for the court of appeals, 556 F.2d at 18,
this assertion must be evaluated in conjunction with the sentence immediately following:
"But the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press, like the First Amendment's
command, do not vary." 343 U.S. at 503. Thus, despite the existence of problems peculiar to
broadcasting, adherence to the basic doctrines of the first amendment in their solution neces-
sarily remains constant.
24. Children who watch television and listen to the radio during the day (often without
parental supervision), and adults who enjoy broadcasting in the privacy of their homes, have
each been characterized as a captive audience by the Commission. 56 F.C.C.2d 94, 97 (1975).
25. 438 U.S. at 748.
1979]
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incompatible with any authentic concern for the quality of life in
our democracy."
One might argue, however, that the development of individual
identity through honest exposure of all aspects of the self is essential
to the flowering of true social order. Under such a view, open com-
munication becomes instrumentally valuable in the discovery pro-
cess; and, in revealing the underside of existence, the irrationality
and aberrations often masked in our daily lives, language-whether
it be that of the lone dissident or of the artist or performer-may
serve to illuminate the whole nature of the individual and produce
a healthier society for it.
Novelist Henry Miller has offered a distinct explanation for
societal decay, one which supports such a view of the crucial role of
communication:
We do not have crime, we do not have war, revolution, crusades,
inquisitions, persecutions and intolerance because some among
us are wicked, mean-spirited or murderers at heart; we have this
malignant condition of human affairs because all of us, the right-
eous as well as the ignorant and malicious, lack true forbearance,
true compassion, true knowledge and understanding of human
nature."
Miller's insight, in thus providing justification for protection of
so-called offensive speech, closely parallels the philosophy of the
first amendment which the Court itself embraced in Cohen v.
California,2 8 when Justice Harlan acknowledged that "[tihe consti-
tutional right of free expression is a powerful medicine in a society
as diverse and populous as ours."29
In Cohen, the Court probed the right of an individual to stand
outside a California municipal courtroom wearing a jacket which
bore the words, "Fuck the Draft." Justice Harlan held that Cohen's
right to exercise free speech clearly outweighed the offensiveness of
26. Kristol, Pornography, Obscenity and the Case for Censorship in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
165 (Feinberg & Gross, ed. 1975). Kristol is referring to obscenity here in a broad way, not
according to the strict definition set out in Miller. His concerns appear to reflect those to
which the Court alluded in Pacifica, when it stated: "These words offend for the same reason
that obscenity offends." 438 U.S. at 746. By this, the Court seems to suggest that values
deeper than majoritarian taste-that is, taboos of cultural dimension-are threatened by the
expression of sexual and excretory language. Yet, the Court's concession that Carlin's words
would probably have full constitutional protection in other contexts undermines the notion
that actual societal harm stems from such language, which is admittedly lacking in pruriency.
27. H. MILLER, HENRY MILLER ON WRITING 214 (1964).
28. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
29. Id. at 24.
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the words on his jacket to children and other persons present in the
corridor; the intrusion was minimal because people could easily turn
away. Justice Harlan's adherence to a stringent test in evaluating
the extent of first amendment protection afforded offensive speech
derived from a recognition of its emotive and symbolic import, be-
yond its rational content, as well as its inherent nonmajoritarian
aspect:
The ability of government, consonant with the Constitution, to
shut off discourse solely to protect others from hearing it is, in
other words, dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy
interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.
Any broader view of this authority would effectively empower a
majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal pre-
dilections.3 1
Justice Brennan convincingly analogized the situation in
Pacifica to that in Cohen: Since radio and television are enjoyed
primarily in the home, the public medium of broadcasting necessar-
ily implicates fundamental privacy interests." The listener's affirm-
ative choice to receive its communication, however, diminishes his
expectations of privacy.32 Any ensuing intrusion is therefore mini-
mal, particularly since unwilling listeners may switch stations or
simply shut off the radio, just as unwitting viewers of the inscription
on Cohen's jacket could have averted their eyes. The plurality, on
the other hand, found that even momentary exposure of children to
indecent speech in the home would constitute an unacceptable in-
trusion of privacy, exceeding that caused by Cohen's exhibition in
a public corridor .
3
In its attempt to distinguish the factual situation in Pacifica
from that in Cohen, however, the plurality abandoned Justice Har-
lan's critical perception that language possesses a double aspect,
communicating not only cognitive ideas, but otherwise inarticulable
emotions which may be equally significant elements of the complete
message.3 5 Far more disturbing, therefore, than the inadequacies of
the plurality's assessment of the privacy and speech interests at
30. Id. at 21.
31. 438 U.S. at 764-65.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 765.
34. Id. at 749.
35. "[W~e cannot overlook the fact, because it is well illustrated by the episode involved
here; that much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not
only ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible
emotions as well." 403 U.S. at 25-26.
19791
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stake, is its willingness to narrow first amendment protection to
only those words valuable in the rational discourse of ideas: "A re-
quirement that indecent language be avoided will have its primary
effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communica-
tion. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the
use of less offensive language."3
Attributing little worth to sexual and excretory language, even
where constitutionally protected,37 Justice Stevens dismissed the
significance of any possible chilling effect of the plurality's reason-
ing.38 Yet, in its attempt to create an artificial distinction between
the content of speech and the form of its expression, the plurality
has increased the danger that first amendment protection may be
withheld to accommodate not merely countervailing interests but,
more ominously, the moral preferences of the majority. Justice Har-
lan had specifically warned against such a devastating possibility
in Cohen:
[Wihile the particular four-letter word being litigated here is
perhaps more distasteful than most others of its genre, it is never-
theless often true that one man's vulgarity is another's lyric.
Finally, and in the same vein, we cannot indulge the facile
assumption that one can forbid particular words without also
running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas in the process.31
Notwithstanding Justice Harlan's logic, the FCC has histori-
cally imposed sanctions upon the broadcast of indecent language.40
Acknowledging that insulation of the public from all possibly offen-
sive programming would permit airing of only the blandest mate-
rial," however, the Commission developed a standard of indecency
36. 438 U.S. at 743 n.18.
37. Id. at 746-47.
38. In a separate opinion, Justices Powell and Blackmun, although otherwise concurring
with the plurality, strongly repudiated the latter's unprecedented reliance on a sliding scale
approach. Id. at 761-62. They pointed out that once speech had been adjudged protected,
the Court may not assess its value or usefulness; matters of taste or style must be left to the
individual. Id. This position of Justices Powell and Blackmun echoes the Court's earlier view
in the recent case of Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
425 U.S. 748 (1976). The Court there refused to compare the value of commercial speech-
such as information regarding the price of pharmacy items-with that of explicitly political
messages.
39. 403 U.S. at 25-26.
40. For a thoughtful examination of past sanctions imposed by the FCC on obscene and
offensive broadcast messages, see Note, Filthy Words, the FCC, and the First Amendment:
Regulating Broadcast Obscenity, 61 VA. L. Rav. 578 (1975).
41. Eastern Education Radio, WUHY-FM, 24 F.C.C.2d 408, 410 (1970).
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encompassing more than merely offensive language. In Eastern
Education Radio (WUHY-FM),12 the FCC proscribed as indecent
speech which was both patently offensive according to prevailing
community standards and "utterly without redeeming social
value.""3
In Pacifica, however, the FCC abandoned the latter prong of
this definition; while recognizing the probable social value of Car-
lin's monologue, the Commission labeled it indecent merely because
it was "patently offensive."" The Supreme Court, upholding the
Commission's redefinition, phrased the distinction between obscen-
ity and indecency in this manner: "Prurient appeal is an element
of the obscene, but the normal definition of 'indecent' refers to
nonconformance with accepted standards of morality.' 5 Equating
moral nonconformity with indecency, within the meaning of section
1464, however, would seem to contravene long standing first amend-
ment doctrine,'6 signalling a retreat to an abandoned, paternalistic
42. Id. During a prerecorded interview on WUHY-FM, Jerry Garcia, leader of the rock
group, "The Grateful Dead," interspersed his conversation with four-letter expletives. Over
the dissent of Commissioners Cox and Johnson, the FCC imposed sanctions on the radio
station for the "indecent" broadcast. Commissioner Johnson vehemently opposed the FCC's
two-pronged test of indecency as censorious: "What the FCC condemns today are not words,
but a culture - a lifestyle it fears because it does not understand." Id. at 422. Buttressing his
assertion that the openness of offensive language often represents health and vitality, see also
A. MONTAGU, THE ANATOMY OF SWEARING (1967), Commissioner Johnson presented the follow-
ing insightful lyric and commentary:
Oh perish the use of the four-letter words
Whose meanings are never obscure;
The Angles & Saxons, those bawdy old birds,
Were vulgar, obscene & impure.
But cherish the use of the weaseling phrase
That never quite says what you mean.
You had better be known for your hypocrite ways
Than vulgar, impure & obscene.
Let your morals be loose as an alderman's vest
If your language is always obscure.
Today, not the act, but the word is the test
Of vulgar, obscene & impure.
Whatever else may be said about the words we censor today, their meanings are
not 'obscure.' I cannot say as much for the majority's standards for indecency.
24 F.C.C.2d at 425.
43. Id. at 412.
44. 56 F.C.C.2d at 97-99. In his dissent in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 37 (1973),
Justice Douglas objected to the prong of "offensiveness" as an element of obscenity because
such a standard "cuts the very vitals out of the first amendment." Id. at 45.
45. 438 U.S. at 740 (footnote omitted). "Obscene material is material which deals with
sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487
(1956) (footnote omitted). By way of comparison, indecent material does not appeal to pru-
rient interests but is nevertheless "patently offensive."
46. See, e.g., Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959), where the
19791
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view of first amendment goals.47
The plurality sought to buttress its departure through an analy-
sis of congressional intent regarding the broadcast medium. Justice
Stevens pointed to the use of the word "or" in the statutory ban on
language which is "obscene, indecent or profane," as further evi-
dence of legislative intent to proscribe separate categories of broad-
cast speech.48 Conflicting judicial construction of parallel statutes,
however, undermines the persuasiveness of such linguistic inter-
pretation."9 In Hamling v. United States,10 the Supreme Court in-
terpreted section 1461 of title 18 of the United States Code,5' which
prohibits mailing of "obscene, lewd, lascivious, indecent, filthy or
vile material,"" as banning obscenity only.53 Similarly, in reviewing
convictions for violations of title 18, section 1462 ' in United States
v. Twelve 200-Foot Reels of Film,55 the Court declared its readiness
Supreme Court struck down a New York law under which the state had denied petitioner a
license to show a filmed version of Lady Chatterley's Lover. New York's interest in protecting
its citizenry from the movie's approving depictions of adultery was insufficient to abridge the
first amendment guarantees:
[The protection of the first amendment] is not confined to the expression of ideas
that are conventional or shared by a majority. It protects advocacy of the opinion
that adultery may sometimes be proper, no less than advocacy of socialism or the
single tax. And in the realm of ideas it protects expression which is eloquent no
less than that which is unconvincing.
Id. at 689. For reaffirmance of this view, see also Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
47. For a clear example of that long rejected paternalistic notion of the first amendment,
see the dissenting opinion in United States v. One Book Entitled Ulysses, 72 F.2d 705, 709
(2d Cir. 1934) (Manton, J., dissenting).
48. Taken to its logical conclusion, the Court's linguistic analysis would suggest prohibi-
tion of yet a third category of profane speech. The Court declined to address this possibility,
however, preferring to limit its statutory construction to accommodate a decision on the
particular facts before it.
49. "Nothing requires the conclusion that the word 'indecent' has any meaning in § 1464
other than that ascribed to the same word in § 1461. Indeed, although the legislative history
is largely silent, such indications as there are support the view that §§ 1461 and 1464 should
be construed similarly." 438 U.S. at 779 (footnotes omitted) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
50. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
51. 18 U.SC. § 1461 (1976).
52. Id.
53. In so doing, the Supreme Court relied on an earlier interpretation of the same statute
by Justice Harlan in Manual Enterprises, Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1961). Although Justice
Harlan recognized that the terms used in the statute had various shades of meaning, overrid-
ing congressional concern to prevent dissemination of prurient matter through the mails
indicated the creation of a single ban on obscenity.
54. 18 U.S.C. § 1462 (1970).
55. 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973) ("[Ilf and when such a 'serious doubt' is raised as to
the vagueness of the words 'obscene,' 'lewd,' 'lascivious,' [and] 'immoral' as used to describe
material in section 1462," the Court would construe such terms as limited to the standard
for obscenity, as elaborated in Miller v. California).
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to construe as "obscene" all materials falling within the statutory
ban on interstate transportation of "indecent, lewd, lascivious,
filthy or immoral" materials. In an attempt to distinguish the stat-
utes, Justice Stevens contrasted the primary legislative concern for
deterring the dissemination of prurient matter through the mail
with the efforts of the FCC to control nonprurient, offensive pro-
gramming over the airwaves. This distinction, however, growing out
of a concern for the special nature of broadcasting, is grounded in a
basic misconception of the interests at stake. For unless one accepts
at face value the plurality's unsubstantiated condemnation of sex-
ual and excretory language, its concern for the protection of listen-
ers, especially minors, appears overly paternalistic. While in the
context of obscenity, the requirement of pruriency is more easily
satisfied as to minors,51 the Court has always required some minimal
threshold of erotic appeal to justify prohibition of communica-
tions.5" "Speech that is neither obscene as to youth nor subject to
some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to
protect the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks
unsuitable for them."5 Certainly, concern for the welfare of children
does not end with the government's perception of the best interests
of minors; the Court has long upheld the paramount right of parents
to determine how best to rear their children. 0 Even accepting the
plurality's assertion. that most parents would find the Carlin mono-
logue offensive, those who do not share the values of the dominant
culture may find exposure of their children to Carlin's message ac-
ceptable."
56. 438 U.S. at 746-47.
57. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
58. Erznoznik v. New York, 422 U.S. 205, 213 n.10 (1975).
59. Id. at 213-14. In his Pacifica dissent, Justice Brennan noted that "a narrowly drawn
regulation prohibiting the use of offensive language on broadcasts directed specifically at
younger children constitutes one of the 'other legitimate proscription[s]' alluded to in
Erznoznik." 438 U.S. at 768 n.3. Brennan also recognized that younger children lack the
"capacity for individual choice," id. (citing Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 650 (1968)),
necessary to evaluate the content of communications geared directly to them.
60. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925).
61. See, e.g., Jack Straw Memorial Foundation, 29 F.CC.2d 334 (1971), providing com-
ments by parents completely satisfied with radio programs containing "indecent" language.
For example:
Peggy Goldberg is a housewife and mother of four children ranging in age from
12 to 23.,She heard both the Sawyer and Bevel broadcasts. She remembers that
she found Bevel's talk to be interesting, but that she was bored by Sawyer. She
does not recall hearing any language which she considered offensive. She encour-
ages her children to listen to KRAB and she thinks the Bevel broadcast was
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Moreover, fears expressed by the Court'and Commission that
narrowing the standard of unprotected broadcast speech to obscen-
ity alone would result in preemption of the airwaves by offensive
programming appear unfounded. Most stations are commercially
sponsored and, therefore, maintain their existence by catering to
majority interests. Lamenting the media's aversion for the "novel
and the heretical," one commentator has perceived that "inequality
of air power" is as much a reality in broadcasting as is inequality
of bargaining power for consumers."2 Thus, governmental regulation
is necessary, not to suppress speech, but rather to counteract this
trend by keeping the airwaves open to a variety of cultural tastes
and views. In his concurring opinion for the court of appeals, Chief
Judge Bazelon echoed this view when he asserted that "[a]lthough
scarcity [of spectrum space] has justified increasing the diversity
of speakers and speech, it has never been held to justify censor-
ship. '6 3 The common perception that radio and television have be-
come the major instruments of mass communication lends addi-
tional support to this reasoning. Indeed, large segments of the
population, particularly poor people, are limited in their ability to
take advantage of any other media." By granting the Commission
power to relegate "indecent" programs to late night hours, the Court
has effective sanctioned the erosion of society's principal forum for
divergent expression. 5
In a case as recent as Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,61 the Court extended full pro-
tection of the first amendment to commercial speech, in recognition
of the significance to society of the broad dissemination of such
information. That holding stemmed from a comprehension that
wide communication enhances responsible exercise of individual
choice, a factor crucial to effective societal functioning. The plural-
ity in Pacifica broke with this expanded view, deferring instead to
competing majoritarian sensibilities. Yet, in the face of potential
stultification of the airwaves, provision of an adequate warning prior
meritorious and worth having in the Seattle area.
Id. at 348.
62. See J. Barron, Access to the Press, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967).
63. 556 F.2d at 29 (emphasis in original).
64. 438 U.S. at 775.
65. This is particularly true for noncommercial, listener-sponsored stations such as
WBAI-FM. The willingness of its subscribers to support the station financially indicates the
extent to which its audience both values and needs this particular form of communication,
66. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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to broadcast, coupled with the ability of listeners to turn off the
program, would seem adequate to protect privacy rights of unde-
sirous listeners. If the Court is to remain true, therefore, to that
developing view of the first amendment as protecting not only
speech deemed valuable as a matter of consensus, but also lang-
uage which may appear iconoclastic and even offensive by virtue
of its form, the balancing methodology of the-Court, as paternalisti-
cally applied to the broadcasting medium in Pacifica, must be
critically reappraised. Once the public interest standard governing
the airwaves is seen as encompassing a constitutional concern for
promoting the pursuit of individual identity as an essential means
of fostering societal well-being, then the role of the Commission
must be entirely different from that articulated in Pacifica. Rather
than tailoring language to fit a procrustean bed of prevailing com-
munity acceptability, the FCC must commit itself to maintaining
broadcasting as an open forum-a forum which, with appropriate
prior warnings, will provide the widest possible range of diversified
communications.
JACQUELINE SHAPIRO
Trading on Market Information: Rule lOb-5
and Market Insiders-United States v.
Chiarella
In United States v. Chiarella, the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit held that anyone who regularly receives material
nonpublic information is subject to the prohibitions of rule 10b-
5. The author of this casenote discusses the expansion of liability
created by this holding and analyzes the questions raised by the
decision.
Vincent Chiarella was an employee of Pandick Press, a printing
house located in downtown Manhattan. Pandick Press specializes
in printing financial documents such as annual reports, proxy state-
ments and disclosure statements for tender offers and mergers. Be-
tween September 1975 and November 1976, Pandick Press printed
documents for five separate takeover bids.' Chiarella, a "markup
1. Four of the transactions in question involved tender offers and one was a merger. The
record did not disclose whether the takeovers were "hostile." Neither the parties nor the court
attached any significance to these distinctions.
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